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Appellant,

THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER OF SEPTEMBER 14, 1990
IS A FINAL ORDER
The estate has taken the position that the judgment
notwithstanding the verdict is not an appealable final judgment.
A review of the pleadings in this case is helpful in determining
whether the Order constitutes a final judgment.

This action was

instituted by the filing of a "Notice of Claim to an Elective
Share."

The Notice is filed pursuant to U.C.A. 75-2-201 and

constitutes the only pleading presently before the court in
behalf of Rose Hemmert.

The District Courtfs Order conclusively

denies Rose Hemmertfs claim for an elective share.

In

determining an analogous situation in a 1980 case, the Utah
Supreme Court stated:
An Order which denies an application for
intervention, with prejudice, does make final
disposition of the claims and assertions of the
applicant, and is therefore appealable . . . Where the
denial of a motion to intervene, or any other final
ruling or order of the trial court, goes unchallenged
by appeal, such becomes the law of the case, and is not

thereafter subject to later challenge. Tracy v.
University of Utah Hospital, 619 P.2d 340, 342 (Utah
1980)
Respondent claims there are other issues which should be
litigated before this appeal.

The alleged remaining issues as

identified in the Respondents Brief are identified and refuted
as follows:
(1) The validity of a Real Estate Contract between the
deceased, Lyman Hemmert and Michael Hemmert needs to be
determined.
The single largest asset listed in the estate inventory is a
Real Estate Contract whereby Michael Hemmert owes to Lyman
Hemmert over $290,000.00 for the purchase of the Bushnell Motel
in Brigham City.

The validity of that Contract and the question

as to amounts owing is a separate lawsuit, totally independent of
Rose Hemmert's claim to elective share.

While the determination

of that question may affect the amount of money distributed to
Rose Hemmert, it is clearly a separate lawsuit between the estate
and the purchaser of the property.
(2) Florida law may prohibit Rose Hemmert from receiving
anything less than a fee interest in the residence she and Lyman
Hemmert occupied in Florida.
It is conceded that Florida statute appears to require that
the surviving spouse receive fee title to the parties1 residence.
However, this is a determination totally independent of the claim
for elective share.

In order to convey any title to the real

property located in Florida, it will be necessary to complete an
ancillary proceeding through Floridafs judicial system.

The

ancillary probate in Florida will distribute the Florida real

2

estate pursuant to Florida statute.

Those proceedings will be

totally independent of this appeal.
(3) The validity of provisions in the deceased's Will
concerning a social security set-off against Rose Hemmert's
portion and disinheriting anyone contesting the Will should be
determined.
If the jury's verdict is upheld and Rose Hemmert is granted
an elective share in the estate, then she takes independent of
the Will.

In that event both of these issues are moot.

Judicial

economy and a desire to limit the cost to the litigants

argue

that unnecessary litigation of these issues be avoided.

There

are no pleadings presently before the court concerning these two
issues and, therefore, they do not affect the finality of the
court's Order.
(4) Rose Hemmert's portion of the estate may have already
been exceeded by the widow's allowance she has been receiving
since Lyman Hemmert's death.
The fallacy of this argument is that the widow's allowance
is not chargeable against any inheritance or portion of the
estate ultimately distributed to Rose Hemmert.

U.C.A. 75-2-403

conclusively states:
(2) The family allowance is not chargeable
against any benefit or share passing to the surviving
spouse . . .
(5) The issue as to whether the dental benefits paid as
widow's allowance to Rose Hemmert should be off-set against her
portion has not been determined.
This argument fails for the same reason as argument number
4.

Utah statute specifically excludes any type of family
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allowance as an off-set against the widowfs portion of the
distributive estate.
The only issue plead by Rose Hemmert and currently pending
before this court is the right to an elective share of the
estate.

The District Court's Order makes a final disposition of

the claim of Rose Hemmert and is, therefore, appealable.
II.
THE ESTATE HAS TOTALLY FAILED TO ADDRESS THE CHOICE
OF LAWS QUESTION RAISED IN THIS APPEAL
The estate's Brief ignores the issues as framed in
Appellant's Brief.

It appears the estate is conceding the choice

of laws question as outlined by Appellant.
1.

The estate has totally failed to respond to the

prevailing legal approach which states that the validity of a
contract is determined by the law of the location where it was
made (lex loci contractu)•

The estate has made no explanation as

to why this approach should not apply in the present case.
2.

The estate has failed to address the most significant

contacts theory.
Appellant's Brief noted that an emerging number of
jurisdictions have adopted the most significant contacts test in
determining the validity and interpretation of contracts.
Respondent's Brief fails to even address this theory.

At page 12

of its original Brief Appellant challenged the Respondent to
compile a list of facts in the case which indicate the State of
Florida has the most significant contacts with the Prenuptial
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Agreement.

Respondent has failed to accept that challenge.

It

is thus undisputed that Utah has the most significant contacts
with this Prenuptial Agreement.

Therefore, Utah law should apply

as to questions concerning the validity of the Agreement.
III.
RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO EVEN ASSERT THAT THERE IS A
"MARITAL DOMICILE" THEORY
Respondent's Brief includes the following excerpt from the
transcript of a hearing held in chambers immediately preceding
the commencement of the trial. The speaker is Attorney Brian
Florence, Attorney for the Respondent herein.
. . . I have prepared for submittal to you an
annotation from ALR 2nd, Volume 18, and two cases out
of the State of Ohio - excuse me. One case out of the
State of Ohio, 1966, and one out of Wisconsin from
1959, which suggests that the place that the Prenuptial
Agreement is prepared or executed is not a relevant is not the only relevant factor to consider in deciding
which law should apply to its validity, but that the
matrimonial domicile would be the law to determine the
validity of the Prenuptial Agreement. (T8 L18-25, T9
Ll-3)
Respondents Brief fails to now even allege that there is
such a theory of "matrimonial domicile."

Respondent does not

cite a case from Wisconsin and the only reference Respondent's
Brief makes to the Ohio case is in reproducing a copy of the
trial courtfs Conclusions of Law which cite the Ohio case.
(Osborn)•

It appears the Respondent has

conceded that there is

no such theory as the "marital domicile" approach.
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IV.
THE TRIAL COURT HAD RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS CASE TO DETERMINE
ONLY THE LAW, NOT ISSUES OF FACT
Respondent contends that the trial court was correct in
applying Florida law as to the validity of the Prenuptial
Agreement.

The only authorities cited by Respondent in support

of this contention are five pages of Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law entered by the District Court.

One must

conclude that the Respondent could find no higher authority to
support the District Court's decision.

Respondent is literally

attempting to lift himself by his own boot straps.

It is highly

questionable whether the trial court's entry of Findings of Fact
was even proper.
As we have numerous times indicated the right of
trial by jury is one that should be carefully
safeguarded by the courts, and when a party had
demanded such a trial, he is entitled to have the
benefit of the jury's findings on issues of fact; and
it is not the trial court's prerogative to disregard or
nullify them by making findings of his own. Mel
Hardman Productions, Inc. v. Robinson, 604 P.2d 913,
917 (Utah 1979).
It was the jury's prerogative to determine which
evidence was to be credited and to draw reasonable
inferences from that evidence, . . . of course we view
the evidence in the light most supportive of the
verdict. Sintron v. Milkovich. 611 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah
1980).
Appellant concedes that Ceritos v. Utah Venture No. 1, 645
P.2d 608, 613 (Utah 1982) allows a trial court to make Findings
following direction of a verdict.

However, in order for those

Findings to have any legitimacy, the legal basis for directing
the verdict must be sound.

In this case because the legal basis
6

for the trial court to apply Florida law in determining the
validity of the Prenuptial Agreement was improper, the Findings
of Fact entered by the court are absolutely worthless.

They do

not constitute any authority persuading an Appellate Court to
uphold the September 14, 1990 Order.

In reviewing questions of

law, no deference is given to the trial court position.

Grayson

Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989).
CONCLUSION
Utah law should be applied in determining the validity of
the Prenuptial Agreement.

The jury has, therefore, returned a

legitimate verdict ruling that the Prenuptial Agreement is not
valid.

The District Court's Order and judgment setting aside the

verdict should be reversed with instruction to the trial court to
reinstate the jury verdict.
DATED this

day of May, 1991.

BEN H. HADFIELD
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE
Attorneys for Appellant
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